INTRODUCTION
Twenty-six years ago, the first drug court opened its doors in MiamiDade County, Florida. 1 Traditional drug courts 2 were founded as a reaction to retributive sanctions used to fight the "War on Drugs" 3 and to relieve overburdened criminal courts with high drug-related caseloads. 4 Drug courts have received praise because they shift the focus of criminal sanctions for drug-addicted defendants from punitive to rehabilitative. 5 Subsequent to the founding of drug courts, legislatures and judges across the country have created alternatives to the traditional drug court model. 6 These alternatives include community-based approaches, 7 swift sanction probation programs, 8 and a mix of the two. These programs have aimed to correct perceived problems 9 with traditional drug courts. In doing so, alternative policies have shifted the way the justice system views, treats, and sentences addicts.
Drug courts and community programs aim to divert alcoholics and addicts to an alternative system through which they receive treatment and learn how to sustain their sobriety after their interactions with the courts end. 10 While these programs stress the participant's rehabilitation, 11 2. This Note distinguishes between "traditional" drug courts, such as the Miami-Dade Drug Court, discussed infra Part I.C-D, and "alternative" drug courts, such as community courts, community-panel drug courts, and swift-sanction programs, which are the subject of this Note and are discussed infra Parts II-IV.
3. President Richard Nixon first called for "an effective war" to counteract the "national and international" drug problem in an address to Congress in 1971. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), 1971 PUB. PAPERS 739. Despite this rhetoric, it should be noted that President Nixon advocated rehabilitative ideals to address the drug problem. See id. at 743-45 (proposing an allocation of funds "solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of drugaddicted individuals"). 9. As discussed infra Part I.D.5, traditional drug courts have had difficulty defining the role of the public defender and finding an appropriate medium between punishing drug crimes and administering treatment.
10. See Murphy, supra note 4, at 476-77. [Vol. 84 success is largely measured by quantitative statistics: How many of the participants have graduated 12 and have the programs reduced recidivism rates? 13 While these measurements are important, the underlying sentencing theory-rehabilitation-requires a more nuanced approach to the analysis of the programs. Treatment programs' effectiveness must also focus on the individual and how she is rehabilitated through the process, both in the short and long term.
This Note discusses the policy implications and effectiveness of alternative drug courts. Part I provides a brief history of the legal policy of treating addicts and the founding of state and federal drug courts. 14 Part II outlines three alternative drug court models: (i) community courts that use a holistic approach to sentencing and treatment, such as the Red Hook Community Justice Center; 15 (ii) community-panel courts that use community volunteers, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court; 16 and (iii) swift and certain sanction programs, such as Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement 17 (HOPE). Part III examines the success of these programs both quantitatively, analyzing recidivism rates and graduation from the programs, and qualitatively, focusing on the programs' effects on individual participants. 18 Finally, Part IV highlights elements of each program that will ensure addicts receive appropriate treatment. 19 It argues that, to further these goals, it is necessary to maintain holistic approaches to sentencing, an informal courtroom, and clear and consistent sanctions for program violations. Additionally, research must be conducted that measures qualitative data on a long-term basis to ensure that the rehabilitative policies have a lasting effect on participants' recoveries. These suggested changes, if implemented, would ensure that drug-addicted defendants receive the tools necessary to be rehabilitated. 20 However, the 1960s and 1970s saw a cultural shift: drug use and drug-related arrests increased dramatically. 21 This "drug revolution" 22 led to federal legislation such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 23 and the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973. 24 While lawmakers had previously used rehabilitation theory in formulating sentencing regimes, 25 the "War on Drugs" led to a shift in sentencing policy in the United States 26 -and with it, a changing view of the addict as criminal. 27 This part examines the history of drug crimes and courts as they relate to the theories of punishment. First, this part reviews the four theories of punishment-rehabilitation, deterrence, retributivism, and incapacitationas they relate to the definition of addiction. Second, this part tracks the criminal justice system's struggle with understanding addiction in legal terms. Subsequently, this part discusses the formation and structure of the first drug courts. Finally, this part explores the basic model for traditional drug courts, the common eligibility requirements, and the structure of the treatment programs as a means for comparison with the alternative treatment programs that are the subject of this Note. , it had become common to ask, 'Is rehabilitation dead?'").
27. As some critics note, with his "War on Drugs" campaign, President Nixon "transformed the public image of the drug user into one of a dangerous and anarchic threat to American civilization," stating " 
A. Rehabilitation and Drug Crimes:
The Theories of Punishment Drug addicts present a quandary for the criminal justice system: How should a court punish an individual for whom criminal behavior is the result of an underlying disease? 28 One of the primary tenets of drug courts is to move away from the retributive ideals of the 1970s and 1980s 29 toward a rehabilitative goal. 30 While rehabilitation has historically been a primary tenet of sentencing policy, 31 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries mark the introduction of another theory of punishment that focused on punishing offenders for their wrongs-retributivism. 32 These two competing theories-rehabilitation and retributivism-were utilized in formulating modern drug crime policy. 33 28. The American Society of Addiction Medicine, a member of the American Medical Association, defines addiction as a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and related circuitry. Dysfunction in these circuits leads to characteristic biological, psychological, social and spiritual manifestations. This is reflected in an individual pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief by substance use and other behaviors. Addiction is characterized by inability to consistently abstain, impairment in behavioral control, craving, diminished recognition of significant problems with one's behaviors and interpersonal relationships, and a dysfunctional emotional response. Like other chronic diseases, addiction often involves cycles of relapse and remission. Without treatment or engagement in recovery activities, addiction is progressive and can result in disability or premature death. One working definition of recovery is "a process of change through which an individual achieves abstinence and improved health, wellness and quality of life." Definition of Recovery, NAT'L COUNCIL ON 
Utilitarian Theories
Rehabilitation is a subset of utilitarianism, a category that also includes incapacitation and deterrence. 34 Utilitarian theory posits that there is a balance between improving and punishing the offender, thereby reducing recidivism and protecting the public. 35 The theory, advocated for by philosopher Jeremy Bentham, aims to evaluate a course of conduct by the "amount of happiness and suffering that is generated by the conduct." 36 The theory is forward-looking; an individual's past criminal acts are largely irrelevant in deciding her punishment. 37 The theory of rehabilitation posits that the decision to commit a crime is not free will, but rather is determined by various sociological, psychological, and biological factors. 38 Rehabilitation is premised on the notion that punishment should include treatment so that the defendant is able return to society "so reformed that he will not desire or need to commit further crimes." 39 Drug courts rely on rehabilitation when formulating treatment and sentencing regimes. 40 In addition to rehabilitation, utilitarian theories include deterrence and incapacitation. The goal of deterrence is to prevent crime through "actual or threatened punishment." 41 Deterrence may be accomplished generally, by using society's awareness of punishment of a crime to deter others from committing future offenses, 42 and specifically, by deterring a specific offender from reoffending. 43 CONFINEMENT 165, 182 (2013) Incapacitation theory states that the most effective way to ensure someone does not reoffend is to incarcerate or physically isolate her. 44 The theories of incapacitation and deterrence affect the treatment of addicts in the criminal justice system. For example, deterrence and incapacitation have been the underlying justifications for strict sentencing regimes implemented in connection with the War on Drugs. 45 Deterrence is also used as justification for swift sanction programs. 46 For example, advocates of HOPE theorize that the strict probation requirements and the use of swift and immediate sanctions deter probationers from violating the terms of probation or reoffending. 47 
Retributive Theories
The Rockefeller Drug Laws reflected another theory of punishment: retributivism. 48 Many hypothesized that rehabilitation was not accomplishing the goals it set out to address. 49 Both liberals and conservatives blamed rehabilitation for thwarting the goals of punishment. 50 Theorists and criminal justice actors began focusing their attention elsewhere, primarily on retributivism as a means to reduce recidivism. 51 The theory of retribution structures sentencing so that individuals receive sanctions justified on the grounds that the "offenders deserve it. Punishment depends on the individual and her past criminal acts; it is not concerned with society "or on the possible consequences of the infliction of punishment." 53 Retributivism may refer to legalistic retributivism, which focuses on law breaking as an indicator for the appropriate punishment, or moralistic retributivism, the moral guilt that accompanies particular criminal acts, also known as "just deserts." 54 Because of these conflicting theories of punishment, courts are faced with determining how to sentence addicts. On the one hand, addicts may pose costs and dangers to society because of their addiction. 55 On the other hand, drug court theory "meld[s] substance abuse treatment and punishment," combining theories of punishment looking to rehabilitate the offender while maintaining an element of retributive punishment. 56 These competing theories of punishment have been utilized prior to and throughout the creation of drug courts and their progeny. 57
B. Formulating Policy: A Brief History of Courts' Struggles with Sentencing Addicts
The theories discussed in the previous section serve as the basis for understanding how and why legislatures and courts have structured sentencing policy for addicts. This section examines the evolution of courts' struggles to appropriately punish drug-addicted defendants while maintaining the desire to rehabilitate.
One of the first efforts to address the issue of sentencing addicts was the adoption of "status statutes." 58 For example, California implemented a state statute that made it a criminal offense for a person to be "addicted to the use of narcotics." 59 Upon review, however, the Supreme Court struck down the California statute as a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 60 The Court likened drug addiction to being "mentally ill, or a leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease." 61 The Court decided that (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) ) ("For a retributivist, the moral culpability of an offender also gives society the duty to punish. Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is true, we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.").
53. 67 In Powell, the defendant-who showed clear signs of alcoholism-was convicted of public drunkenness under a Texas statute. 68 The defendant challenged the conviction on the grounds that it violated the Eighth Amendment. 69 In a lengthy opinion, Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality, 70 discussed the implications of alcoholism and debated whether it could be considered a disease. 71 The Court ultimately decided not to extend Robinson, distinguishing the case by reasoning that it was Powell's choice to be on a public street while drunk. 72 The Court reasoned that the defendant was punished not for his status as an alcoholic, but for his public behavior. 73 In his concurrence, Justice White opined that if it is not a crime to "have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics," then it cannot "be a crime to yield to such a compulsion." 74 Justice White saw no difference between the statutes at issue in Powell and Robinson. However, he voted with the majority because he did not think the punishment was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 75 The dissent in Powell saw this case as nothing more than an extension of Robinson. 76 79 The Court's analysis of Powell's "criminal" activity highlights the complexity of sentencing alcoholics and drug addicts. While the plurality argued that addiction should not be a get-out-of-jail-free card for offenders, the four-justice dissent espoused the idea that the state should not punish people for involuntary acts resulting from a "compulsion." 80 The disagreement among the justices in Powell represents the pull between rehabilitative and retributive values when determining drug treatment programs within the criminal justice system. 81 
C. The Creation of Drug Courts
The previous section discussed the way in which courts sentenced addicts prior to the creation of drug courts.
This section examines the establishment of drug courts, beginning with judge-operated programs and eventually extending into the vast network of state and federal drug courts that exists today. 82 In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress tied drugs to drug traffickers and terrorists, calling for strict sentences. 83 parameters were echoed throughout the states 84 and led to an increase in the prison population as a direct result of drug arrests. 85 However, many of the defendants incarcerated on drug charges were nonviolent offenders. 86 Some legal scholars became frustrated with the state of drug sentencing, and as a result, a movement began in the late 1970s and 1980s calling for an alternative to the existing sentencing policy. 87 Legal scholars believed that criminal dockets were overburdened with drug-related offenses due to the "intensification of the war on drugs in the 1980s." 88 Some judges felt "discomfort" with the restricted sentencing discretion in the existing drug laws, which left no room for treatment programs. 89 As an alternative, Judge Roger J. Kiley of Cook County, Illinois, devised a system where he would meet with drug-addicted defendants and probation officers from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. in an effort to address addiction more directly. 90 Similarly, federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York implemented his own program to meet with defendants charged with drug-related crimes. 91 In in which courts treated low-level drug crimes and found that most addicts were not held accountable for their crimes. 94 Instead, defendants were often arrested, kept in jail for twenty-four hours, and let go on bail. 95 The same defendants would reappear several weeks later on a new drug-related charge. 96 Charges would begin to pile up, costing the state or local authorities money. 97 In an effort to address this cycle of reoffending, Judge Klein concluded that diverting low-level, nonviolent drug offenders to a yearlong treatment program would save the state money and could better treat their addiction. 98 The original Dade County Drug Court was founded with the goal of processing drug crimes in a cost-effective manner in order to reestablish a link between the offender and the community, thereby reducing recidivism rates and rehabilitating offenders. 99 Drug courts sought to shift the policy focus from regulating drug crimes through reducing drugs on the street to focusing on treatment of drug addiction. 100 Following the initial success of the Dade County Drug Court, similar drug courts opened throughout the country. 101 Today, there is at least one drug court in each of the fifty states, as well as in the District of Columbia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam. 102 In addition to the originally realized general adult drug courts, many states have implemented alternatives especially suited for subsets of society-including military veterans, Native Americans, and juveniles. 103 In 1997, the 104 The report laid out ten key components that are necessary to consider when treating drug addiction. 105 These components have served as a guide to the creation of alternative drug treatment programs. 106 
D. The First Generation of Drug Courts and How They Work
Drug courts work to ensure that defendants are accountable to the court system while receiving drug treatment. 107 They rely on "mentoring and monitoring" addicts to help them in "rebuilding their lives." 108 The programs combine high-level monitoring with a comprehensive treatment program: judges use rewards and punishments to "condition" defendants to be responsible for their actions. 109 The first drug courts used two primary models-the deferred prosecution model and the post-adjudication model. 110 Each of these models established eligibility requirements and followed a basic treatment model.
The Deferred Prosecution Model
In deferred prosecution programs, also known as "pre-adjudication," if the defendant meets the eligibility requirements, she is diverted to the drug There are three underlying approaches in the deferred prosecution model. First, in a "diversion" approach, the case is dismissed upon successful completion of the program. 115 Second, a "pre-diversion" approach requires that the individual plead guilty to the charges. 116 After successful completion, the plea is withdrawn or the case is dismissed. 117 Finally, in a "stipulated facts" approach, the defendant stipulates to the facts of her case, and the charges are dismissed upon successful completion of the program. 118
The Post-Adjudication Model
In the post-adjudication model, the defendant pleads guilty to the underlying charge, and the sentence is deferred or suspended while she participates in the drug treatment program. 119 If she successfully completes the program, the sentence is waived and the conviction is often expunged. 120 This model is considered effective because the judge's consistent monitoring throughout the course of the program gives added incentive to the individual to complete treatment. 121 
Eligibility Requirements
Before an addict is diverted to drug court, she must satisfy several eligibility requirements. 122 Eligibility for drug court programs varies depending on the jurisdiction. 123 Generally, courts look to the severity of the charges, 124 previous probation violations. 125 Additionally, the defendant must have an established alcohol or drug dependency. 126 Some programs require that individuals with a history of violent crimes be automatically excluded. 127 Eligible defendants spend an average of twelve to eighteen months in drug treatment, during which time the defendant is randomly drug tested on a regular basis. 128 The judge reviews the progress of the individual, who may only graduate after continuous abstention from drugs and alcohol. 129 If an individual fails a random drug test, she will be sanctioned, sometimes resulting in jail time or community service. 130 A defendant may be terminated from the program if the court determines that she is not benefitting from treatment or if she commits another crime while enrolled. 131 
The Basic Treatment Program in Traditional Drug Courts
While the treatment program utilized by each traditional drug court varies, most models follow a similar approach to medical treatment. The Miami-Dade Drug Court provides a useful example for understanding a version of the basic approach to medical treatment. 132 There, each offender must complete a three-step program to graduate. 133 Phase I, "detoxification," seeks to end chemical dependency on drugs. 134 If the individual requires detoxification, the court transfers her to an independent treatment provider, where an individualized treatment plan is created. 135 During Phase II, the individual continues to attend counseling, but is no longer in residential treatment. 136 treatment program while the judge monitors her progress. 137 This phase lasts for about fourteen to sixteen weeks. 138 If the defendant regresses, the judge may send her back through Phase I. 139 Finally, the individual moves to the "aftercare" stage in Phase III. 140 Here, the individual is introduced to "academic and occupational preparation for a new type of life style." 141 The individual continues to provide the court with urine samples to be tested for drugs and is encouraged to maintain sobriety without the supervision of the court. 142 This phase often lasts for about thirty-six weeks and contains the same caveat as Phase II that if the individual fails or regresses at any point, she is recycled through the earlier phases. 143 The individual makes one final court appearance after the completion of all three steps, at which point the charges are dismissed and the individual graduates from the program. 144 Twelve months after the successful completion of the entire program, the court seals all records related to the arrest. 145 
Criticisms of Traditional Drug Courts
Many scholars and criminal justice actors saw drug courts as the "magic solution" to America's drug problem. 146 However, the newly formed courts received-and continue to receive-criticism from various vantage points. 147 Some criticize drug courts from a treatment perspective. 148 They claim that because addiction is a disease, it is impossible to determine how many times a defendant fails an element of treatment before she is terminated from the program and subjected to criminal sanctions, making the process "arbitrary." 149 These critics question why the criminal justice system is involved at all in the treatment of a disease. 150 A second criticism comes from defense attorneys, who find their place within the drug court system inconsistent with traditional notions of defense. 151 In criminal court, defense attorneys are advocates for the defendant; their job is to get their client a favorable outcome. 152 In drug courts, however, this role becomes more difficult with the additional treatment element in sentencing. 153 Some defense attorneys believe that the pressure for defendants to enroll in a treatment plan is quite strong, sometimes requiring the defendant to plead guilty when they otherwise would not have. 154 Additionally, the contours of due process rights a defendant waives when accepting guilty pleas conditioned on treatment are unclear, which is disconcerting to defense attorneys. 155 Finally, some believe that returning to rehabilitative ideals is misguided and imprudent. 156 These critics posit that "the emergence of drug courts [is] a nostalgic yearning for the idealism of an earlier decade . . . that never really existed." 157 They believe that the turn toward more punitive sentencing in the 1970s was for good reason and was meant to address the ineffectiveness 158 of a rehabilitative approach. 159 Critics of the drug court movement advocate for "pulling back on the reigns" so that the programs may be evaluated and modified as necessary. 160 
II. ALTERNATIVE DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS
In an effort to address some of the criticisms set forth in the previous part, some jurisdictions have created alternative drug treatment programs. 161 courts, specifically, the Red Hook Community Justice Center (RHCJC) in Brooklyn, New York, which incorporates community involvement with drug treatment. 162 Then, this part explores community-panel courts, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court ("the WCC Court") in Iowa, which replaces the role of the judge with members of the community. 163 Finally, this part addresses swift sanction probation programs, such as HOPE. 164 These three programs use different policies and procedural models to address issues surrounding sentencing and treating addicts.
A. Red Hook Community Justice Center
Community courts were first founded with the goal of incorporating community involvement in the criminal justice system. 165 They seek to ameliorate perceived problems in the criminal justice system in three ways. 166 First, community courts strive to bring "citizens and defendants closer in a jurisprudential process that is both therapeutic and accountable." 167 The courts are often multijurisdictional, placing various aspects of the justice system-such as family court, criminal court, and drug court-under "one administrative umbrella." 168 Second, the courts focus on "social and behavioral origins of the problems" experienced by their participants. 169 Finally, community courts bring social services to the community to which they may not have had access previously. 170 The RHCJC relies, in part, on the "Broken Windows" theory. 171 The Broken Windows theory is "an outgrowth of deterrence theory" and promotes the idea that "the presence of minor crime and other visible conditions of disorder sends a signal to potential lawbreakers that any crimes they commit are likely to be overlooked." 172 The theory argues that one way to lower crime rates is to prosecute low-level crimes. 173 signal to the community that the police are maintaining order, which engenders "relie[f] and reasurr [ance] ." 174 As an outgrowth of Broken Windows, RHCJC is "designed to permit the community-and the courtto regain authority over conduct that threatens the community's safety and economic viability." 175 In so doing, some community courts prosecute primarily low-level misdemeanors and violations, leaving violent and felony offenders to the purview of the traditional criminal court system. 176 The RHCJC was the nation's first multijurisdictional community court. 177 Prior to the RHCJC's creation, the neighborhood of Red Hook, Brooklyn, had a predominantly poor population 178 and was a "hotbed of crime." 179 The issues in the neighborhood, however, were not just centered around the violence, but also the deep mistrust of local law enforcement and its geographical isolation. 180 The RHCJC was founded following drugrelated violence in Red Hook's public housing complexes. 181 The community court officially opened its doors in April 2000. 182 174. Id. (noting that if police do not monitor low-level crimes, such as "window breaking," then "one unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing").
175. The RHCJC also houses a court attorney, a court clerk's office, a resource coordinator, court officers, a court reporter and interpreter, personnel from the Center for Court Innovation, an alternative sanctions office, and members from various partner organizations, including the District Attorney's office, Legal Aid defense attorneys, and police precincts. Id. at 36-39.
178. The median income in the neighborhood in 1990 was $9500 per person, which was less than one-third of the median for New York City as a whole. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 23. Over 30 percent of the neighborhood's working age men were unemployed and 78 percent of children in the neighborhood were being raised by a single parent. Id.
179. As quoted in the 1988 Life Magazine cover story, Red Hook had frequent shootouts between rival gangs and drug dealers, and the author described the neighborhood by saying " [t] 182. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 1. The RHCJC was founded on the tenet of six distinguishing features of community courts: (i) individualized justice, (ii) expanded RHCJC has three primary features. First, the court system utilizes deterrence as a theory of punishment, looking to ensure that there is a "certainty of meaningful punishment-including follow-up sanctions in response to a defendant's noncompliance with the original court order." 183 To accomplish this, judges require that defendants appear in court on a regular basis to demonstrate compliance with the programs. 184 Second, RHCJC's founders believed that intervention targeting the root problem of an offender's behavior is crucial to rehabilitation. 185 As part of this "intervention" stage, RHCJC employs drug treatment programs, social services, and other community-based programs to engender positive change in an offenders' behavior. 186 Finally, RHCJC uses procedural justice to mend the distrust between people in the community and law enforcement. 187 The system looks to stimulate "voluntary compliance with the law by enhancing the perceived legitimacy . . . in judicial decisionmaking as well as the cultivation of close ties to the community." 188 RHCJC's model allows for greater discretion when deciding whether to divert a defendant to drug treatment. 189 In traditional drug courts, defendants who have a violent criminal history are often not eligible for treatment. 190 Community courts, however, have greater discretion in determining each defendant's sentence or treatment. 191 Because RHCJC diverts defendants from various backgrounds to drug treatment, the sentencing options, (iii) varying mandate length, (iv) offender accountability, (v) community engagement, and (iv) community impacts. See id. at 3-4; see also Malkin, supra note 161, at 1578 (citing four main issues on which the founders of the RHCJC relied, including social services for defendants and residents, resources for young people, participation in local community service projects, and "the court's ability to help the community improve public safety"). 187. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7-9. 188. Id. at 4-5; see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 900 ("The creation of a court physically closer to the community, more responsive to the problems that give rise to crime, and accountable to the community to reduce crime and deliver remedial services, offers the Court a transformative role that will involve citizens in the processes of social regulation and control that are essential to crime prevention and justice.").
189. programs are more varied than traditional drug courts in substance and length. 192 Procedurally, the defendant and defense attorney consent to a clinic staff member making an assessment to determine whether she has committed the crime as a result of addiction. 193 Clinic staff look to identify a variety of possible symptoms, including addiction, psychological trauma, brain injury, and mental illness. 194 The assessment consists of extensive questioning and a urine test. 195 The clinic gives an individualized recommendation tailored to the defendant and her particular treatment needs. 196 With this assessment in hand, the prosecutor decides whether to charge the defendant or divert her to a treatment program. 197 The prosecutor and judge are free to alter the suggested treatment plan at their discretion. 198 Once the treatment plan is formulated, the defendant may choose to plead guilty, with the agreement that upon successful completion of the program, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD) will be entered. 199 The judge has the discretion in more serious cases-those that would traditionally call for incarceration-to enter a conviction, with treatment as a condition thereof. 200 RHCJC works with external providers to assist with providing treatment to defendants. 201 Health insurance often plays a role in matching a defendant with a provider because RHCJC does not fund treatment. 202 During the course of the treatment, the court consistently monitors the defendant. 203 The clinic also ensures that the defendant fulfills other requirements of her sentence. 204 This monitoring stage includes consistent interaction with the clinic; staff members meet in groups to analyze the defendant's progress. 205 Staff members attend weekly meetings to discuss individuals who may not be complying with the program requirements. 206 206. See id. The judge, the RHCJC project director and deputy director, the clinical coordinator, the resource coordinator, the alternative sanctions coordinator, assistant District defendants who have had attendance problems, failed a drug test, or otherwise failed to meet a sentencing requirement. 207 The group makes no decisions regarding the defendant's status in the program, as the policy dictates that the court hears the defendant's side of the story. 208 Defendants usually attend court on the Thursday or Friday following the list meetings. 209 The judge meets with each defendant to discuss her status. 210 Beyond these formal meetings, the small size of the building provides defendants with consistent interaction with court staff. 211 There are no formal guidelines for sanctions if a defendant fails an aspect of the treatment program, 212 allowing the judge to punish the defendants on a case-by-case basis. 213 Typical sanctions include writing an essay on the merits of staying clean and community service. 214 RHCJC provides prevention programs that target addiction before the conviction of a crime. 215 For example, RHCJC created the Red Hook Public Safety Corps, which utilizes AmeriCorps volunteers and local community members to assist with service projects, including painting over graffiti, cleaning parks, and tutoring. 216 The center also operates youth programs, including sports teams, development programs such as a youth court-where kids are taught how to mentor their peers in real world cases-and a variety of technical and artistic classes. 217 RHCJC's approach has raised some concerns when compared to other drug court programs. First, RHCJC's informal atmosphere is contrary to a "traditional legal perspective." 218 Additionally, more consistent and strict sanctions than those utilized at RHCJC for noncompliance may provide stronger incentives for defendants to stay clean. 219 For example, the Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court-a traditional drug courtspecifically lays out the potential jail sentences that the defendant will incur if she fails a drug test. 220 allow for the judge to take into account "legally irrelevant factors" when sanctioning, potentially raising due process concerns. 221 The sentencing hearings that are required for all defendants who fail a stage in their treatment, however, may assuage due process concerns. 222
B. Community Court with a Twist: The Woodbury County Community Drug Court
A second model that has emerged as a means of treating addicts within the court system is the community-panel drug court, where trained volunteers conduct hearings and render sentencing decisions. 223 These panels are given similar authority to judges and can administer sanctions and rewards to program participants. 224 A district court judge oversees the program, but defendants only appear before the judge on the panel's recommendation. 225 The panel, however, usually has the ability to send an individual to jail for one to three days without seeing the judge. 226 Generally, a community-panel court has four to eight panels, each consisting of four to six community members, serving on a rotating basis. 227 The panel members come from a variety of professions, 228 and several are recovering addicts. 229 Woodbury County Community Drug Court opened in July 1999. 230 After seeing the pervasive problems within their community of rampant drug use and corresponding low-level crimes, practitioners in Woodbury County approached the judiciary with the hope of founding a drug court. 231 However, due to a lack of available judges to assist, the committee had to 221. See id. at 96 (noting that the judge may "feel a personal stake" in the defendant's case, leading to varying sanctioning); see also Fagan & Malkin, supra note 166, at 928 ("For some, the trade-off of due process rights for treatment, implicit in the therapeutic court model, is seen as a threat to delegitimize the new Court.").
222. find a creative solution. 232 The WCC Court's goal is to be a "last stop" to rehabilitation while reducing incarceration costs and judges' caseloads. 233 The WCC Court uses a model similar to traditional drug courts. 234 Eligible defendants are diverted to an alternative program focused on treatment in lieu of incarceration. 235 The decision makers are made up of a four-person panel, with district court Judge John Ackerman serving as the overseeing judge. 236 This model decreases the role of the judge and "places an emphasis on the relationships that are developed between the client and the panelists, which in turn creates a higher level of accountability between the client and the community." 237 To be eligible for the program, an individual must have an underlying substance abuse issue as evidenced from the complaint or charging instrument in her case. 238 A drug court officer then administers the Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory to the individual, a test used to determine whether someone has a chemical dependency. 239 If the individual meets the eligibility requirements, she is assigned a "home" drug court panel "based upon interest, learning style, needs and the 'style' of the panel." 240 To graduate from the WCC Court, an individual must complete four phases. 241 First, the defendant must "stabiliz [e] ." 242 In doing so, the participant must establish a treatment plan approved by the panel, agree to randomized drug testing, break ties with friends or family who use drugs, attend Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, and acknowledge the need for recovery. 243 Second, the participant must complete the "acceptance" phase, where she must maintain the above activities, find a sponsor in her recovery, and complete community service, if necessary. 244 The third phase, known as "maintenance/aftercare," lasts for approximately three to six months. This phase encourages participants to find employment, develop a plan for the future, and participate in a "leisure and relapse plan." 246 At the completion of phase three, the participant graduates. 247 The final phase, entitled "recovery," is meant to be "continuing and ongoing" after the individual graduates from the program. 248 The program provides various incentives and sanctions to encourage the participants to stay clean. 249 Incentives include verbal praise and applause, certificates for the completion of each phase, a reduction in community service hours, phase advancement, and a reduction in court costs. 250 If a participant fails a drug test or another prong of treatment, sanctions range from having to make up missed appointments or assignments to increased testing, placement in detention, placement in an inpatient treatment facility, and complete termination from the program. 251 The Gordon Recovery Center 252 provides the treatment services, and they are largely paid for by the managed care agency in Iowa. 253 If the program is not covered by the Iowa state agency, then Medicaid, private insurance, or family members pay for the services. 254 Some have suggested that community panels have several advantages that may be preferable to recovering addicts. 255 First, because defendants report directly to community members, they may feel that there is an aspect of accountability that is absent in a judge-administered program. 256 Additionally, panel members volunteer their time to the program without pay, which may indicate to participants that panel members care about treating others, not that they are there because they are required to be. 257 Finally, because volunteers-including former addicts-come from all professions and positions in the community, the defendant may be more likely to listen to someone with whom they can relate. 
C. Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement
While some jurisdictions work toward lowering drug crimes through treatment, such as the RHCJC and the WCC Court, others use probation and swift sanction programs to target addiction. In 2004, Judge Steven Alm in Honolulu launched HOPE, targeting drug addicts through probation. 259 HOPE's goal is to lower recidivism rates while rehabilitating addicts by implementing "swift, predictable, and immediate sanctions" each time they violate the terms of the program. 260 With reports of high success rates, both Washington and California have adopted similar systems. 261 Judge Alm incorporated the theory of deterrence into his probation program. 262 His basic theory was that "the threat of a mild punishment imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater deterrent effect than the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed and uncertain." 263 Judge Alm also integrated theories of behavioral economics into his program. 264 Unlike other drug treatment programs, HOPE is focused on remedying the negative implications of the parole system. 265 Probation violations have accounted for more than half of the prison population growth since 1990. 266 Judges usually have broad discretion to determine the parameters of defendants' probation, including random drug testing. 267 Generally, however, the consequences of breaking parole occur far later than the actual violation. 268 probation. 269 Judges give parolees a warning in open court that "any violation of probation conditions will not be tolerated." 270 If a parolee violates a term of her probation, she will immediately be sentenced to jail time. 271 As part of the monitoring strategy, HOPE requires that probationers call into court each weekday to determine whether they will be tested. 272 Each participant is assigned a color code at their initial hearing, and a different color code will be chosen for randomized testing every day. 273 If the probationer's color is selected, then she must appear before her probation officer that day for a drug test. 274 If the probationer fails to appear, the court immediately issues a bench warrant. 275 If the probationer fails the drug test, the probation officer completes a "Motion to Modify Probation" form that is immediately given to the judge. 276 A hearing is held in conjunction with this motion within seventytwo hours, and the probationer is confined until such time. 277 If the judge confirms a violation, then the probationer receives a short jail sentence, to be served in short order. 278 Upon the completion of the jail sentence, the probationer continues participation in HOPE, reporting to his probation officer on the day of release and subsequently on a regular basis. 279 If an offender continues to violate the terms of the probation, then she is often confined to an intensive substance abuse treatment service. 280 Instead of the treatment approach to addiction found in the RHCJC and the WCC Court, HOPE relies on strict sanctions and immediate consequences to deter addicts from using. 281 In HOPE, drug treatment is only provided to participants if the probationer fails a drug test, thereby 269. See id.; see also Rosen, supra note 263, at 13 ("[P]eople are most likely to obey the law when they're subject to punishments they perceive as legitimate, fair and consistent, rather than arbitrary and capricious.").
270. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 13; see also Hawken, supra note 47, at 40 (noting that the central theory behind HOPE is "the commonsensical one that certainty and swiftness count for more than severity in determining the deterrent efficacy of a threatened punishment").
271. Upon a violation, the parolee attends a hearing within seventy-two hours, when, if the violation is upheld, he is sentenced to a short jail term, which may be served on the weekend if the parolee is employed. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN only targeting those "who cannot stop using drugs on their own." 282 Participants do not have to meet eligibility requirements as they would in other drug courts, accepting people with all variations of criminal histories and different levels of addiction. 283 Part of the theory behind HOPE's infrequent use of drug treatment is that not all drug abusers are addicts, and thus the expensive drug treatment programs should be saved for those who need it the most. 284 If a HOPE probationer fails three or four drug tests, then she may be mandated to attend a residential drug treatment program in lieu of probation revocation. 285 When the probationer is diverted to a residential treatment center, her success in completely abstaining from drug use becomes an additional condition for avoiding revocation of probation or a prison stay. 286 This "as needed" use of drug treatment may lead to cost savings and ensure that spots in residential centers are open for those who require outside assistance to stay clean. 287 After the HOPE pilot program's success in increasing probation compliance, the Hawaii legislature expanded the program, which now manages the probation of more than 1500 defendants. 288 After several studies were published reporting HOPE's success, 289 Washington and California modeled their own programs on HOPE's principles and procedures. 290 Drug courts' successes are measured by quantitative and qualitative studies performed by the court's personnel, independent organizations, or scholars. 296 The previous section introduced three different models used in treating drug addiction. 297 This part discusses and analyzes the programs' successes, including a discussion of scholars' research methods used in compiling the results.
A. Quantitative Results of Alternative Drug Courts
This section reports the quantitative results of the three drug treatment programs. First, this section addresses the reason that quantitative methods are used. 298 Second, it recounts the quantitative results for the RHCJC, the WCC Court, and HOPE, including graduation rates and recidivism rates. Finally, this section tackles some criticisms of each program based on these results.
Why Use Quantitative Methods?
In measuring alternative drug treatment programs' successes, researchers often utilize quantitative methods as opposed to performing detailed qualitative studies. 299 The reason for this is twofold. First, quantitative results are easy to measure. 300 Researchers need only look to the rates of graduation, recidivism, and other program statistics to determine numerical success. 301 The RHCJC performed a comprehensive study, with the help of funding from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), released in November 2013 304 ("the Report"). The Report analyzes adult criminal cases arraigned at the RHCJC between 2000 and 2009. 305 In the Report, the RHCJC compiled information regarding practices and recidivism rates at other traditional misdemeanor and drug courts in Kings County. 306 In analyzing the drug treatment program, the RHCJC found that a total of 1452 defendants were diverted to receive treatment for addiction, an average of 5 percent of the total caseload over the ten-year period. 307 
a. Participation in Drug Treatment
The Report explains why individuals with certain underlying charges were diverted to treatment programs more than others. 308 For example, marijuana and traffic offenses receive lighter sentences in comparison to other drug or prostitution charges, thereby making the cost of the treatment program disproportionate to the severity of the offense. 309 The Report hypothesizes that the reason for this is that the cases "assigned to drug treatment appear[] to be related to the severity of the potential penalty for the offense as well as to the tendency for the offense to be related to drug addiction." 310 318 During this period, 53 percent had a final disposition of convicted, 1 percent had an ACD entered, 34 percent were dismissed, and 12 percent had a warrant issued for violating a term of the probation. 319 In other words, approximately 34 percent of defendants who agreed to drug treatment successfully completed the program, having their charges dismissed. 320
c. Recidivism Rates
RHCJC's recidivism rates were compared with traditional courts. 321 The Report measures recidivism by analyzing the rearrest and reconviction rates within a one-and two-year period. 322 Overall, RHCJC defendants were less likely to be arrested again than comparable defendants in the Kings County Criminal Court. 323 The Report also analyzes the recidivism rates of drug treatment defendants. 324 The Report analyzed 252 defendants from the RHCJC drug treatment program who received a drug treatment mandate and 252 defendants who had "similar cases" from the Kings County Criminal Court. 325 drug treatment at the Misdemeanor Brooklyn Treatment Court. 326 As the Report notes, there was not a significant difference between the sample groups. 327 In RHCJC, 48 percent were rearrested within two years, while defendants from the Kings County Criminal Court were rearrested at a rate of 43 percent. 328 The Report suggests that there is no significant difference between the recidivism rates in part because the "type of drug treatment intervention used in [RHCJC]-as opposed to deterrence and legitimacymay not be one of the primary mechanisms contributing to [its] overall effectiveness in reducing recidivism." 329
d. Praise and Criticism
Public officials have praised RHCJC as a key reason for the decrease in crime in the Red Hook neighborhood. For example, former Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes credited RHCJC as the primary reason for the decrease in murders in two separate years since the court's inception-2003 and 2006. 330 New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio spoke at the facility at RHCJC in 2013 when he swore in the new police commissioner, Bill Bratton. 331 During Bratton's inauguration, Mayor de Blasio said that "the way to fight crime . . . is with the community." 332 Proponents and critics have pointed to several ways in which this model addresses the underlying theories of punishment and ways in which it may cause conflict. First, traditional courts may be required to implement certain sanctions as a result of a failed element of the program. 333 For example, public housing often has a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to drug use, so a criminal court judge may be required to evict a family from their apartment if drug use is found. 334 A community court judge, on the other hand, may work with the housing authorities to enable an addict to continue living in the residence so long as she is under the judge's supervision, allowing greater discretion. 335 The judge's subjective discretion, however, has also raised concerns. 336 Because determinations are made on a case-by-case basis, there may be some constitutional concerns because sentencing is largely subjective. 337 This is due to a shift in the court actors' roles in a community court. Generally, the judge oversees an adversarial proceeding, with the prosecutor and defense counsel standing on opposing sides. 338 However, at RHCJC, judges act not only in their traditional role, but also as an advocate, a broker of social services, and a part of the community. 339 The judge in a community court may not have the requisite expertise for all potential arising conflicts. 340 Additionally, long-term drug treatment programs make up a small amount of RHCJC's caseload, while utilizing a large percentage of the court's resources. 341 While the treatment program is catered to each individual defendant, there may not be the same incentive to stay in line with the program's mandates due to relaxed judicial supervision and lack of structure. 342 These concerns may represent some weaknesses within RHCJC and community justice centers, generally.
The Woodbury County Community Drug Court
The WCC Court has received attention due to its unique structure in using community volunteers as the primary means of administering drug treatment. 343 Several studies have tracked the program's successes and failures. First, Dwight Vick performed a multipart study, analyzing various aspects of the program. 344 The studies examine the program's impact on recidivism rates, look at its cost-effectiveness, and make several suggestions for how the WCC Court can improve in the future. 345 336. See, e.g., Thompson note 6. It should be noted that Vick's studies focused primarily on analyzing the program's effect on juveniles and did not do a comprehensive study on its effect on adults. Therefore, the rates here may differ from studies of other drug courts.
Vick analyzed the court's success through two major categories: graduation and recidivism rates. 346 In his analysis, Vick determined that 100 percent of the clients used marijuana at least once prior to treatment, 23 percent admitted to using cocaine, 90 percent used alcohol, and slightly more than 25 percent admitted to using methamphetamines. 347 About twofifths participated in the program for less than six months. 348 Thirty percent were involved with the program for six months to a year. 349 The remaining clients participated in the program for over one year. 350 
a. Graduation Rates
When analyzing the graduation rate of participants, Vick found that 60 percent of men graduated, while 63 percent of women graduated. 351 Clients had a harder time graduating within the first stages of the program. 352 Only 62.5 percent of clients successfully completed the program if their treatment plan called for graduation within the first four months. 353 Conversely, approximately three-fourths of participants who spent more than four months in the program successfully graduated. 354 
b. Recidivism Rates
Of the WCC Court's graduates, 44 percent did not recidivate. 355 However, the study notes that of the 66 percent that did recidivate in some way, many were likely to commit a drug-related crime: only 20 percent of the graduates who did recidivate committed a non-drug related, nonviolent crime. 356 In analyzing the recidivism rates, Vick also noted that 54 percent of marijuana users, 53 percent of alcohol users, and 50 percent of methamphetamine users recidivated. 357 He compares this to the national average rate of recidivism in juvenile courts-30.8 percent-as opposed to a little over 46 percent here. Id. at 319. He distinguishes that national study because it only accounted for two years after graduation. Id. However, it should be noted that while this study began in 1999, the study does not distinguish between those who graduated in 1999-with five years between their graduation date and the end of the study-and those who graduated in 2004-with less than a year between their graduation date and the study's completion. 
See generally

Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement
State legislatures 358 and federally funded researchers 359 have commissioned several studies to examine the effectiveness of swift-sanction probation programs. The studies analyze the programs' successes in comparison to other probation practices. 360 They use such indicators as number of failed drug tests, missed appointments, and other probation violations. 361 As part of the procedure at HOPE, drug tests are performed both randomly and in accordance with prescheduled appointments. 362 According to one study, probationers tested positive over half the time during the three months prior to their probation. 363 In the first three months of participation, probationers had a positive drug test rate of 9 percent, 364 as compared with the comparison group who tested positive 33 percent of the time in the same period. 365 Finally, after six months, HOPE probationers tested positive at a rate of 4 percent while the comparison group tested positive at a rate of 19 percent. 366 Hawken and Kleiman found that of those who tested positive once, only half tested positive a second time. 367 Of those with two positive tests, only half had a subsequent positive test. 368 The probationers who tested positive more than once were those who not only received sanctions, but who also were recommended for enrollment in a drug treatment program because they "did not desist from drug use under sanctions pressure alone." 369 Hawken and Kleiman also measured the frequency with which probationers missed their appointments. 370 During the three months prior to enrollment, HOPE participants missed appointments with their probation officers 14 percent of the time. 371 Meanwhile, the comparison group had a 22 percent increase in missed appointments, missing them at a rate of 11 percent. 373 After the six-month mark, HOPE probationers missed their appointments at a rate of 1 percent, while the comparison group missed at a rate of 8 percent. 374 Hawken and Kleiman attributed the dramatic decrease in the rate of missed appointments to swift sanctions and speculated that "most probationers are highly compliant with scheduled appointments." 375 Finally, Hawken and Kleiman measured the program's success by looking at how many participants had their probation revoked as compared to the control group. They found that 9 percent of HOPE probationers had their probation revoked due to noncompliance, compared to 31 percent of the comparison group. 376 Similarly, HOPE probationers spent far fewer days in jail as a result of probation violations than the comparison group. 377
B. Qualitative Results
This section discusses qualitative studies that measure participants' perception of the treatment programs.
This section examines the ethnographic data uncovered through questionnaires and interviews in RHCJC, the WCC Court, and HOPE. Then, this section addresses other qualitative studies of related drug treatment programs.
Why Use Qualitative Studies?
Qualitative results amplify quantitative studies in analyzing drug treatment programs' effectiveness. 378 They provide information "compar[ing] the perceptions of those who succeed[ed] in a drug court with those who fail [ed] ." 379 Quantitative studies may not be sufficient because of the ways in which they are conducted. For example, in studying recidivism, it is nearly impossible to ensure that "the differences found in recidivism reflect primarily criteria and processes of selection for drug court handling rather than program effects of the drug court itself. 
RHCJC Interviews and Questionnaires
The RHCJC Report recounts ethnographers' findings from John Jay College of Criminal Justice who interviewed 100 misdemeanor offenders in the Red Hook neighborhood. 381 As compared to Brooklyn's downtown criminal court, offenders who were interviewed responded that Judge Calabrese and the RHCJC team were largely more lenient, were more caring, and would sentence drug offenders to drug treatment programs rather than jail. 382 The study, however, did not report the effectiveness of the drug treatment programs administered by RHCJC, but rather the offenders' general perception of the community court and its actors. 383 
Perception of the WCC Court
In addition to the quantitative results, Vick found that the use of panel members engendered mostly positive feelings among the program's participants. 384 The panel was able to develop "personal as well as professional" relationships with the participants. 385 However, Vick reported that volunteers had two major concerns when interviewed. First, there was a lack of coordination among the agencies involved in the treatment process, which may have lead to clients relapsing due to the loose structure. 386 Additionally, Vick described the interaction among the panel members during the meetings: that volunteers were sometimes passing notes, whispering, and talking under their breath. 387 Additionally, two years after the court's inception, Michael F. Nerney and Robin Wright conducted a review of the WCC Court, also specifically analyzing its effect on adolescent treatment. 388 There, the researchers provided several recommendations for the future of the community panel treatment program. 389 First, they suggested training the treatment providers and panelists so they better understand the variety of issues that may be affecting addicts. 390 Second, they suggested having more positive interactions between the participants and the court's staff so as to publicly reward good behavior. 391 381. For a more detailed description of the study, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 21- In a review of drug offenders diverted to the HOPE probation program, Hawken anonymously surveyed a sample of 167 HOPE probationers. 396 She interviewed probationers and others involved in the program, including prosecutors, public defense attorneys, probation officers, judges, and other court staff to determine stakeholders' perception of the program. 397 Hawken found that clients had a mostly positive perception of the program regardless of how they entered the program, whether they were incarcerated, and whether they received unwanted drug treatment as a condition of a violation of probation. 398 In response to open-ended questions, many clients responded that the program was beneficial. 399 A majority of participants reported that the program was not too strict and that it was useful in reducing drug use 400 and improving relationships. 401 Some were unsatisfied with the subjective position of the judge. 402 Program participants-including defendants' probation officers, prosecutors, public defenders, and even some judges-reported that the variation between judges in the severity of sanctions may be problematic. 403 Those who received stricter sentences as a result of a probation violation often blamed judicial bias, including ethnic bias. 404 However, a comparison of the data shows that the difference is not between offenders, but instead between judges. 405 This qualitative study did not measure continued sobriety or quality of life among past participants. Hawken and Kleiman acknowledge this shortcoming, stating that the probationers were only studied while they were participating in the program. 406 
Other Qualitative Studies
The qualitative studies that have been performed with respect to the effectiveness of drug treatment programs have been minimal. One such study was done with participants in the Greene County Drug Court in Arkansas. 407 There, the study interviewed fifteen recruited participants, 408 including some individuals who were in county jail and others who were graduating from the program. 409 All questioning was done within twelve months of the program's completion. 410 The study mostly analyzed the varying reasons for entering drug court 411 and the participants' satisfaction therein. 412 The study found, generally, that individuals were largely unhappy with the lack of confidentiality, that the program often only utilized counselors who specialized in alcoholism as opposed to drug addiction, that judges were largely subjective, and that individuals disliked the frequency of incourt appearances. Some individuals considered this final problem the catalyst for their "failure" in the program. 413 A key distinction between those who completed the program and those who did not was that those who "failed" out of the program perceived the judge as unfair. 414 The study also analyzed whether the individuals were able to use the drug court program as a "chance to repair problems that their past drug abuse had caused to their family, friends, and community." 415 Sixty-seven percent of the graduates of the program and 57 percent of the noncompleters reported that their participation in the drug court program helped them regain the trust of their family, friends, and community. 416 405. See id. This perceived-albeit incorrect-bias is further evidence of why uniform sanctions may lend credibility to drug treatment programs. Some suggested awareness that their behavior made friends and family "victims" and considered the program restorative. 417 The report, based on these findings, concluded that the drug court program benefited participants because they were "made accountable for their behavior and [were] required to adhere to a rigorous schedule of counseling, 12-step meetings, drug testing, meaningful employment, community service, and regular monitoring of progress by the drug court judge." 418 This qualitative study is one example of an in-depth measurement of the long-term effects of a drug treatment program and may serve as an example to future studies. 419 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE POLICIES AND STUDIES
Various aspects of each alternative drug court discussed in Parts II and III have been effective, while others conflict with the rehabilitative goals of drug courts. 420 This part examines and suggests several policies that alternative drug courts should adopt that consider the nature of addiction, as well as incentives for defendants to get and stay clean. First, this part addresses several aspects of each of the three alternative drug courts that may be most effective going forward. Second, this part discusses the need for long-term qualitative studies to better determine which policies are most effective in rehabilitating addicts in the court system.
A. How to Address Addiction in a Retributive System: Suggestions for Future Drug Courts
While drug treatment programs will likely always have slight variations among jurisdictions, there are several aspects of drug treatment that should be implemented in every drug court. This section provides three suggestions that may lead to a deeper connection between the court system and the issue of drug addiction. First, drug courts should maintain an informal atmosphere, where a variety of court actors, health care providers, social workers, family, and other members of the community are involved in the process. Second, drug courts should adopt consistent and predictable sanctions other than jail time to be implemented in the event of program violations. 421 Third, regardless of the model, rehabilitative treatment-not punishment-should be the primary focus of drug courts. 420. See Boldt, supra note 56, at 1246 ("This conflict is brought into clearer focus when the analysis is centered on the imperfect fit between the adversary system and rehabilitative regimes.").
421. However, unlike HOPE, incarceration should be saved for the most serious cases. Labeling a drug addict as a criminal may be counterproductive to the goal of long-term rehabilitation.
Maintain a Trustworthy and Informal Atmosphere
Procedural justice is one drug court component that adds legitimacy and leads to increased success. 422 Procedural justice should include not only a perceived fairness in the courtroom, but also an atmosphere that engenders trust and a holistic approach to determining an appropriate treatment program or sanction. There are several small measures that drug courts should take to strengthen procedural justice.
First, drug courts should involve a variety of actors when treating addicts. As is practiced at RHCJC, 423 drug courts should utilize social workers, specialists trained in drug treatment and addiction, community members, aid organizations, and others that may contribute to appropriately crafting a treatment program.
Having these individuals available will ensure two things. First, the variety of actors will guarantee that defendants understand that they have access to and support from more than the traditional court actors-the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney-involved in the decision-making process. Because individuals often seek to identify themselves with groups, 424 they may act in accordance with the group's decision-i.e., the decision of the group of individuals determines the parameters of the program-even if it is against each individual's self-interest. 425 By intertwining the authority of the court with the community's approval, defendants may be more likely to view the decision as legitimate and be more open to compliance. 426 Second, drug treatment experts should be required to help determine the appropriate treatment for a defendant. A judge, while knowledgeable in many areas, may not be an expert on the psychological aspects of addiction or on the ways in which one sanction will affect the defendant outside the courtroom-by losing her job, her home, or her family. 427 By having several people involved in the decision-making process, a defendant is guaranteed a treatment program that is personally crafted to her needs by an expert with the requisite knowledge. Crafting an appropriate sentence for a drug-addicted defendant cannot be one-size-fits-all. Every addict is 422 different, with varying psychological, health, and personal needs. It is crucial that this is taken into account when determining how to make-and who should make-the ultimate decisions for treatment. 428 One way to accomplish this is through the program implemented by the WCC Court. 429 There, the court employs, in lieu of a judge, a panel of community members who make the ultimate decision on how to sentence drug court participants. 430 While the panel may not have professional experts, it may instill a sense of legitimacy in the defendant. A defendant may be more willing to listen to a group of four people that have been through the same process and have stayed sober than a judge who may not have had the same experience.
In addition to seeking procedural justice through the decision-making process, drug courts should maintain an informal courtroom that places the defendant on the same level-literally and figuratively-as the court actors. First, as is done at RHCJC, the judge should sit at the same level as the defendant as opposed to sitting on an elevated bench. 431 The defendant should receive public praise for successfully completing elements of her treatment. For example, the judge and court staff may applaud, provide verbal praise, or award offenders for particularly strong progress. 432 Further, the judge should always converse directly with the defendant, ask her to tell her own story, and ask for justification if she violates a term of the treatment program. 433 This is particularly important in situations in which the defendant may have tested positive for drugs during a follow-up appointment or violated a term of her probation or treatment program. Instead of sanctioning an individual with no explanation allowed, 434 it is important to have a hearing during which individuals may defend themselves, provide explanation, or discuss with the judge a way to avoid further violations.
Allowing the offender to participate in decision making lends legitimacy to the process and encourages the addict to follow the treatment plan and rehabilitate. udges are advised to treat individuals with respect, afford all parties the opportunity to be heard, and clearly explain the rationale behind their decisions.").
434. While HOPE has a hearing to determine whether there was an actual violation, the program does not allow for the probationer to put on a defense, see Hawken, supra note 47, at 38, while the RHCJC allows for a hearing with the possibility of presenting a defense following any violation, see LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 93-94.
Implement Swift and Predictable Sanctions
Drug courts should utilize immediate and predictable sanctions that apply to violations of the program or parole. While a punishment may have slight variations among defendants with the same violation, it should be uniform practice to apply sanctions for all defendants who commit each particular type of violation. The sanctions should be known, immediate, and consistent in kind both among judges and among defendants. The sanctions, while predetermined and immediate, should not include incarceration. 435 The sanctions should be uniform according to the type of violation, while still leaving room for slight variations among defendants based on their particular circumstances. This would result in a range of predetermined sanctions for each violation. For example, missing an appointment would always result in increased court appearances. However, the number of increased court appearances could vary among defendants depending on their particular circumstances and the reasons for which the appointment was missed. 436 Because of the individualized needs of each defendant, in the event of a violation, a hearing should be held to determine the nature of the violation and the appropriate sanction, according to the range already in place at the drug court. This would ensure that defendants are aware of the consequences of violations while still allowing drug courts to treat the individual needs of each defendant.
The sanctions should be uniform and swift for three reasons. First, individuals are not forward thinking and may respond more strongly to immediate consequences. 437 For example, the defendant who knows that she will receive a punishment several months in the future is much more likely to violate the terms of her probation than the defendant who will be given an immediate sanction. 438 Therefore, if the sanction is known and immediate, a defendant may be more likely to comply with the terms of the sentence or probation.
Second, uniformity among sanctions may provide more legitimacy to the drug court proceedings. If two similarly situated defendants receive different sanctions for an unexcused probation violation or different treatment plans-one receiving increased court appearances and the other termination from the program-they may not perceive the decision to be legitimate, thus threatening their treatment. For example, in the HOPE 435. As some scholars have speculated, incarceration may never be an appropriate means of rehabilitating an addict. See Hora & Stalcup, supra note 152, at 724 ("[I]t is naive to believe that merely incarcerating a substance abuser, that is, physically incapacitating them, will lead to recovery from addiction or cessation of alcohol or other drug use."). For this reason, incarceration should be used sparingly here.
436. See infra notes 441-42 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure at RHCJC in the event of a violation).
437. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 49-56 (1985) (discussing how offenders are likely more impulsive, failing to take into account future consequences).
438. See id.
program, Hawken's studies show that one judge consistently gave harsher sanctions for probation violations. 439 The individual who receives the harsher sanction may blame bad luck or the judge, thus detracting from the program's effectiveness. While mandatory treatment may be effective, the offender must believe that the sentence is legitimate for the treatment to work. 440 While uniformity is important in drug treatment, courts should allow for justifications and defenses by the defendant before a sanction is imposed. A hearing determining the nature of the violation and the appropriate sanction within the predetermined range should be held. 441 A judge should be required to explain why she is choosing one end of the predetermined range over the other. 442 This would help defendants not blame their sanction on a judge's supposed biases.
Finally, variation across judges and among offenders may lead to due process concerns. One criticism of drug courts has been that judges become too invested in the proceedings. 443 Instead of maintaining the traditional neutral role of decision maker, a drug court judge is intimately involved with the offenders, particularly in a community court model. 444 Without uniform sanctions, the judge's potential biases could affect one addict's sentence and future. Therefore, a consistent and predictable set of sanctions may prevent the risk of due process violations.
Focus on Treatment, Not Criminal Sanctions
The Supreme Court in Robinson v. California and Powell v. Texas raised an important question: Is addiction something that should ever be criminally punished? 445 Drug courts have struggled with this question as well, wondering which punishments are effective for drug-addicted defendants. 446 HOPE, for example, admittedly focuses solely on probation as part of the program and only turns to treatment in the most serious of circumstances. 447 This question becomes exceedingly difficult-and 439. See Hawken, supra note 47, at 43. 440. See LEE ET AL., supra note 106, at 7-9. 441. See supra notes 422-34 and accompanying text. There are different reasons for which a person may incur a violation, which is why a hearing in front of a judge is necessary. For example, one person could have missed a drug test because they were using drugs, while another could have missed a drug test because of a family-or job-related reason. The sanctions for these two groups of people should not be the same.
442. These hearings may also lead to issues regarding judicial discretion in imposing sanctions. However, it is necessary that there be leeway between defendants in different circumstances. One solution may be to have detailed guidelines drafted at the inception of a drug court that clearly lay out when and how a defendant should be sanctioned. abstaining from crime. During recovery, a participant may relapse, but this does not erase the work she has done up until that point. If this person is arrested because of her drug use, then she will be counted as a "failure"-as someone who contributed to the recidivism rate. However, in reality, the person may not have been arrested because of a failure of the program or a policy therein, but instead because of the ongoing nature of recovery. Quantitative studies that measure recidivism and graduation rates do not take these circumstances into account. 454 With these studies, the metric of success is for a short, finite period. 455 Without having more in-depth and long-term studies, it is impossible truly to know which policies successfully treat addicts and which conflict with rehabilitative ideals.
One low-cost solution would be to have a series of questionnaires sent to all participants-both those that graduated and those who were terminated. Programs could administer these questionnaires when each individual leaves the program and then again at yearly intervals. 456 To encourage completion, the questionnaires should be simple and evaluate three things. First, they should measure participants' perception of certain aspects of their treatment. This section would include questions regarding procedural justice, the atmosphere in the courtroom, the parameters of their treatment, and whether the defendants perceived the sentence and sanction to be appropriate. It should also include a section asking participants to articulate the aspects of the treatment program they found to be most effective.
Second, the questionnaires should inquire into past participants' current lives, including relationships with family and friends, employment, and whether they have meaningfully reintegrated into society. 457 Finally, the questionnaires could address the status of the individual's recovery and whether they have maintained sobriety, relapsed, or reoffended.
In deterrence-based probation programs such as HOPE, there may be an issue with participants circumventing the system. A probationer may discover a way to change her behavior for a short length of time, just long enough to fulfill the probation requirements. 458 For example, HOPE is considered a successful solution to probation violations because it shows a 454. See Thompson, supra note 159, at 98 ("Success will need to be measured from a number of different, and perhaps competing, vantage points.").
455. For example, many studies stop after probation ends or are only able to measure one or two years past the graduation date for cost reasons. Hawken and Kleiman's study on HOPE, for example, only followed up with probationers for a year after their probation terminated. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 48-49.
456. While sobriety is lifelong, the questionnaires could not realistically be distributed every year for the rest of an addict's life. Therefore, a period of five years may accomplish the goal without being overly burdensome. These questionnaires may also raise an issue of selection bias where the only individuals to complete them would be the ones most receptive to the program. One solution may be to have the completion of the questionnaires-at least for a time-be a term of inactive probation after individuals have left the program.
457. This section of the questionnaire could be modeled after that used in the Arkansas study, discussed supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
458. HOPE requires that probationers continuously pass drug tests and attend appointments with their probation officers. It does not provide drug treatment unless the probationer continuously violates the terms of his probation. See supra Part II.C. significant decrease in positive drug tests throughout the course of probation. 459 However, because HOPE does not incorporate twelve-step programs or teach offenders how to maintain their sobriety beyond the realm of probation, probationers may reoffend or continue using as soon as they are no longer under the purview of the criminal justice system. While probationers may view the continued threat of sanctions as a deterrent to relapsing during the program, once the threat of sanctions is removed, it is unclear how many will return to using drugs, regardless of whether they reoffend. 460 Therefore, swift sanction programs provide no evidence of how effective HOPE is at treating addicts, only evidence on how effective it is in promoting compliance with the terms of probation. 461 To determine whether the programs are truly working, researchers must perform qualitative and long-term studies, tracking offenders' progress far beyond the program's completion. Requiring questionnaires after the end of probation would easily measure the quality of the drug treatment on offenders' lives without incurring significant costs. These would alert courts to policies that may or may not be effective in rehabilitating drugaddicted defendants.
CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures have consistently struggled with the sentencing and treatment of drug-addicted defendants. In an attempt to solve this problem, several jurisdictions have created alternative drug courts with varying policies that are geared toward lowering crime rates while providing meaningful treatment to addicts. These include community courts, such as the Red Hook Community Justice Center, courts using community volunteers to help determine and administer a treatment plan, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court, and swift sanction probation programs, such as Hawaii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement. These programs have seen success in terms of quantitative measures, but their qualitative long-term success for addicts is yet to be determined.
When treating drug-addicted offenders, the solution can never be to place a Band-Aid on a bullet hole. Because addiction is a lifelong struggle, the solution must be one that provides offenders with the tools to continue to 459 . See supra notes 362-66 and accompanying text. 460. Some probationers acknowledge the strength of the deterrent factors during participation in HOPE. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, supra note 259, at 38 ("Some probationers, when told by their probation officers that their testing frequency is being stepped down as a reward request that it not be stepped down, because they fear that lessfrequent testing will increase their risk of going back to drug use.").
461. Even proponents of the HOPE model acknowledge that the persistence of the "HOPE-effect" has not been studied. See Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 259, at 50. The report notes that one limitation of the study was that probationers were only examined while participating in the program, and therefore Hawken and Kleiman could not conclude "whether the effects of HOPE (e.g., reduced drug use and new arrests) continue after probationers complete their probation terms under HOPE." Id. Hawken and Kleiman acknowledged the importance of this outstanding question. See id.
